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1PART ONE
Plan Colombia
“Plan Colombia” is a proposal of the government of Colombia that was submitted to foreign countries in late
1999, to obtain their political and financial support in its fight against violent men and women:
revolutionaries; narcotraffickers; self-proclaimed vigilantes; and common criminals.  The Colombian
government called it a “plan for peace, prosperity, and the strengthening of the state,” and sought $1.5 billion
of new, emergency foreign assistance.  But the overall Plan contemplated a $7.5 billion budget.
A new administration had been inaugurated recently in Colombia in critical circumstances, the legacy of
the disreputable four-year term of the previous president, Ernesto Samper.  In effect, Samper had been elected in
1994 with a drug financed campaign, which was made public and resulted in the incarceration of top aides. 
Subsequently the U.S. Government engaged in an interventionist campaign to destabilize the president.  In
1996 Samper’s visa to enter the United States was suspended; that same year the U.S. decertified Colombia,
cataloging it as not cooperating in the war against drugs.  (When a country is decertified the door is opened not
only to suspend U.S. assistance but normal trade relations with it as well, by imposing economic sanctions). 
This hostile policy aggressively vocalized by the U.S. ambassador, however, was unsuccessful.  The
Colombian Congress voted down Samper’s impeachment, the military did not rebel, and the president ended
his term.
But in spite of Samper’s reactions to the interventionist pressures—for instance, in 1995 the Rodríguez
Orejuela brothers, kingpins of the Cali drug cartel, were jailed, and in 1997 the political Constitution was
amended to permit the extradition of narcos to be tried in the United States—drug production and
commercialization were not under control.  Colombia had become also a producer of heroin.  Indeed, the so-
called “narcoguerillas,” for the Marxist revolutionary guerrilla groups also were involved in the sordid drug
business, had made substantial gains.  In the last months of Samper’s tenure it was estimated that about half
the country was not under the Colombian government’s control.  In March 1998, it was reported that army
morale was at rock-bottom—the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC, or Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia), the largest and oldest guerrilla movement, had driven the Colombian armed forces
from several bases in the south of the country.  In a survey conducted weeks before the inauguration in August
of the new president, 63 percent of the respondents opined that the guerrillas were capable of seizing power by
force.  Reportedly, the size and potency of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC, or United Self-
Defense Forces of Colombia)—the federation of private, anti-Marxist vigilantes, created in so-called “self-
defense” against the guerrilla insurgency, who are also known as “paramilitaries”—had also increased.
In sum, when the current president, Andrés Pastrana, was sworn-in in 1998, Colombia’s unstable
democracy was in a serious crisis: discredited political institutions; escalating insecurity and violence; exodus
of trained Colombians to foreign lands; major economic recession, high debt and unemployment levels.1  Plan
Colombia was devised as the mechanism of foreign assistance for democratic institution-building and
consolidation, peace, and national general prosperity.
You will note that the projection of resources by the U.S. in a nation like Colombia with regime
instability tends to result in patterns of client-state politics, that is, in interventions of a foreign power in
processes to determine a foreign government.  And this foreign intervention—the allocation of resources for
regime maintenance (or its termination)—can be sought by insufficiently supported democratic regimes (and
oppositions), which can seek clientelistic alliances with the United States and other nations.
The Plan Colombia proposal consisted of a lengthy, very broad program of government.  The text
elaborated ten strategies to achieve its principal objectives, and recognized that these could only be gradually
achieved.  Its lofty tone was of the social democracy currently in vogue in Latin America.  The goal, I quote: “a
Colombia in peace, progressive and free of drugs, modern, democratic..., [prosperous with social justice], with
pride and dignity as a member of the world community.”  Throughout the text emphasis was placed on the rule
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of law and protection of the human rights of all.  The strategies are, of course, interrelated.  For simplicity I
will only highlight segments of five problem areas.
The Economic Strategy
Colombia urgently needed to stabilize its economy, bringing its budget back to equilibrium and cleaning up its
banking system, in order to return to a growing, developing economy and address the social needs of the
population.  Employment would be generated by a mixed economy with an important role of national and
international private enterprise.  But although tax reforms had been implemented and were under way, the
indebted state did not have the resources to conduct effective wars against terrorism and drugs.  The country
urgently needed foreign assistance to finance a budget to generate peace and make the necessary supportive
social investments.  Concretely, the narco traffic was not simply a Colombian problem: it involves producing
and consuming nations; hence the problem should be addressed with international cooperation and co-
responsibility, its cost should be allocated based on the economic capacity of the countries involved, thus the
legitimacy of the claim to the U.S. and other nations that they assist Plan Colombia.
The Peace Process
An integral part of the Plan was the so-called Peace Process.  Before being elected, president Pastrana had met
with Manuel Marulanda, aka Tiro Fijo (Sure Shot), the old peasant leader of the FARC, and had promised to
seek a negotiated peace settlement with the guerrillas.  Although Pastrana’s inauguration was met with a
massive guerrilla violent offensive and no cease-fire was acceptable to the FARC, three months later (November
1998) the government of Colombia began to withdraw from an area about the size of Switzerland in the south
of the country, and declared it a “zona de distensión” (i.e., zone of détente).  The purpose of this, alternatively
called “demilitarized zone” because by law the armed forces, police, and other security forces could not enter it
(and orders of capture against the guerrillas were suspended), was to guarantee the necessary security to
negotiate a peace agreement sought before the end of the president’s term (in August of this year).  As you may
know, on 20 February 2002 Pastrana ended the Peace Process in the face of continued FARC violence, and
ordered the army to reoccupy the détente zone.  Of course, the noted economic difficulties were related to the
guerrillas: massive kidnappings resulted in business bankruptcies; extant insecurity contracted investment
levels; petroleum pipeline sabotage reduced export levels; and very costly attacks against the nation’s
infrastructure, including electrical substations and transmission lines, blown up bridges, explosions of
aqueducts, etc.  Although the Peace Process was mainly focused on the FARC, initiatives were also to be taken
with the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN, or National Liberation Army), the second largest guerrilla
movement, the Plan stated, as well as to obtain the peaceful dismantling of the Autodefensas or the vigilantes
pursuing armed conflict with the guerrillas and their supporters (AUC).
The explicit objectives of the Peace Process were to: establish state control over the nation’s entire
territory; achieve the full acceptance of a democratic regime with only peaceful contests for power; end human
rights violations—the guerrillas were notorious transgressors, e.g., the assassinations and kidnappings of
civilians; and also terminate guerrilla involvement in the narco business.  The idea was, as in the Central
America of the 1990s, to obtain a cease-fire and negotiate a peace accord transforming the guerrillas into
political parties, unarmed participants in the democratic processes.
In all of this the international community was seen playing a vital role.  For one thing, during the Peace
Process foreign assistance was to be channeled to the Colombian armed forces and the police, to enhance their
capabilities to protect the population.  Second, in agreement with international law several countries and
international organizations were expected to assist as observers and mediators of negotiations, and later to verify
the implementation of the peace agreements.  Third, international agencies were to play a role advising and
assisting in the control of investments of the Fondo de Inversión para la Paz (Fund for Peace), the channel of
national and international funds for peace.
Obviously, if successful the peace initiative would have resulted in an extraordinary triumph in the wars
against terrorism and drugs.  There was precedent in Colombia of successful negotiation with a guerrilla group,
as with the April 19 Movement that culminated in its participation in the elections of 1990 under Virgilio
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Barco.  I visited its guerrilla camp in 1989 in the mountains of Cauca when negotiations already had started. 
However, the M-19 movement was of a different revolutionary kind than the FARC.  And as I found out, at
that time its leadership was being motivated into a peace accord because of the belief that violence was futile,
that nothing could be gained by continuing with it, that only Colombia would lose.  Indeed, Mr. Pastrana was
taking a big risk with his unprecedented, unilateral and unconditional surrender of such huge territory to what
had become a highly economically profitable, rural gangster movement, despite its Communist revolutionary
historical ties.
The Antinarcotic Strategy
With the end of the Cold War, in Latin America the U.S. Government shifted security issues to the war against
drugs.  The new American “Big Stick” took as one of its forms the aforementioned yearly certification process.
 Yet the strained relations between the U.S. and the Samper administration had coincided with the dramatic
deterioration of conditions in Colombia.  One thing Pastrana sought was to improve relations with the United
States (actually in August 2000 Bill Clinton visited convulsed Colombia for a few hours).  Thus, there were
more reasons to emphasize the fight against drugs in Plan Colombia.  I mention this because Colombian public
opinion has been often inclined to view the narcotraffic problem more as an international problem than a very
high domestic priority.
The narcotraffic poses a serious threat to Colombia in the vast resources that it generates and its links to
violence and the corruption of public and private institutions, and it distorts the economy and destabilizes the
nation, the Plan stated.  The Plan went on to specify a series of measures that would be taken to destroy the
“chain of the drug,” from its agriculture to its consumption.  I will not detail the proposed reforms in law
enforcement, which included measures to appropriate funds and properties originated by the traffic.  I will rest
with this.
The objective was to reduce the production of the drug industry by 50 percent in six years.  In phase one,
the destruction of the industry would be concentrated in the Putumayo region and other southern areas during
the first year.2  Phase two would take two to three years and take place in the southeast and center of the
country.  And phase three, from three to six years, would be carried out throughout Colombia.
As in other places in Latin America—such as Bolivia and Peru—crops were to be eradicated, and this was
related to the development of alternative legal crops and other types of employment, “profitable, environment
conscious and sustainable.”  Of course, this is easier said than done given the profitability of drug related
production. $570.8 million were planned to assist this alternative-development program, a cost estimated for
the remainder of the presidential term, which included the development of rural infrastructure in strategic areas
and land distribution.
The Strengthening of the State
The growth of the guerrilla movement consisted of its territorial expansion at the expense of the state’s presence
in such areas; and in remote regions not controlled by the state narco activities had developed.  Indeed, in
Colombia the state was not exercising its authority nor complying with its basic obligations: the life, freedom
and property of its citizens were not effectively protected, entire communities were displaced by the violence,
and so on.  To establish the norms of a peaceful society, the armed forces, police and judicial system were to be
reformed and strengthened, guided by the rule of law and respect of human rights.  To end the extant
widespread impunity, the organs of the state themselves would be under transparent and accessible control, the
armed forces included.  While the policy of extradition of Colombians to foreign countries would continue, the
highly inefficient local jail system would be transformed into a high security one.  And a Presidential Program
Against Corruption in the public and private sectors was proposed, as well as establishing a High
Commissioner for Human Rights, a Permanent Commission for Human Rights, and formally extending the
Program for Witnesses and Threatened Persons to control human rights performance.  International assistance to
develop these initiatives and strengthen the state’s more traditional organs of law enforcement included the
implementation of training programs.
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At the core of the state-building, of course, was the modernization/professionalization of the armed forces
and police to gradually construct peace.  The various branches of the Armed Forces would specialize in
combating the revolutionaries or insurgents, the narcos, the vigilantes, and organized crime; the National Police
(PN) drugs and other types of crime; and the DAS (Colombia’s closest equivalent to the FBI) all types of
economic crimes.  The goal: more mobile forces, more agile in their responses, better trained forces that
emphasize offensive operations.  Fundamental to the task was to transform the army into a voluntary corps that
as such would have more permanent, career oriented personnel.  And its size would be increased substantially. 
While wider authority would be given to military or police comandantes in operation-areas to restrict
movement and traffic, the commitment of the state to uphold international humanitarian law was sustained,
proposing the transfer of military cases to the civilian jurisdiction.  And the role of the United States in the
military and police modernization was fundamental beyond funding.  The U.S. would assist in their
reorganization, creating and training specialized units, and be a sustained ongoing source of intelligence.  There
was no substitute to the U.S. supportive role in some areas, as in the planned more frequent and effective
operations to control air space.
Social Development
Finally, Plan Colombia had a “social component.”  It sought developmental assistance for special kinds of
programs, participatory grassroots programs at the municipal and community level.  It was considered that the
violence and correlated corruption would progressively end with increases in civil social participation to obtain
better, more accountable and controlled local government, and to exercise social pressure against the violentos. 
Grassroots participation had a pedagogic function:  the development of a tolerant, democratic collective
conscience.  I should note that the focus on participatory, popular, human development found precedent in a
prior period of heightened U.S. intervention in Latin America: John Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress initiated
in the early 1960s.  You may recall that he established the Peace Corps.  Colombia became one of its main
destinations, and in its spirit the Colombian government led the formation of a nationwide community
development movement.  Government “promoters” of the Communal Action agency assisted local grassroots
groups, formed to carry out a great variety of community projects: building roads or schools, a health unit,
water service, etc.
Since then, non-government organizations (NGOs) had proliferated and were to play a fundamental role in
the social strategy.  In effect, the three principal entities in charge of it were the Presidency (Departamento
Administrativo de la Presidencia), the aforementioned Fund for Peace (Fondo de Inversión para la Paz), and the
Colombian Confederation of Non-Governmental Organizations (CCONG).  Among other functions, the latter
monitors the process of empowering entities to compete to obtain funds to implement social projects.
About a year ago the initiation of Plan Colombia’s “Social Component” was widely advertised by the
government and a call for projects to be selected was formally made.  Eight areas were started:
1. Families in Action: cash subsidies to families of the poorest economic level in exchange for health and
educational commitments; the target: 380,000 families in counties of less than 100,000 people.
2. Employment in Action: employment for unskilled workers building urban infrastructure; the target:
300,000 unemployed throughout the nation.
3. Youth in Action: training programs for semi-skilled work opened for unemployed individuals between
eighteen and twenty-five years old in the seven cities with highest unemployment rates.
4. Roads for Peace: construction and improvement of 10,700 kilometers of roads in 260 counties
generating directly and indirectly 105,000 jobs.
5. Countryside in Action: social and economic, sustainable production projects to benefit small and
middle-sized agricultural producers in three priority areas of conflict.
6. Humanitarian Attention: to address the needs of the victims of terrorist attacks and the population
displaced by the violence.
7. Human Rights: to promote the development of a human rights culture.
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8. Transparency and Peaceful Living Together: projects supportive of developing democratic public
administration and citizen control, and to provide legal property rights in areas where pacts are made to
eradicate illegal crops.
* * *
That the government of Colombia sought U.S. assistance was not surprising.  In 1986, under Ronald Reagan,
the United States had formally confirmed (regardless of our own personal opinion) that it considered the “war
on drugs” necessary for the nation’s security, by establishing the yearly Certification of Drug-Producing
Nations mentioned earlier.  U.S. military and economic aid to combat coca production and its derivatives
became established in the Andean nations.  In 1991 the U.S. Congress passed the Andean Trade Preference Act
under the first Bush.  This trade benefit exempting certain exports from Colombia, Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador
from any U.S. tariffs, was an offshoot of the certification process to wean the hemisphere’s coca-growing
nations from the drug trade.  And under Clinton, despite the decertifications during the Samper administration,
anti-drug aid had increased to Colombia in three years, from $22 million to about $100 million in 1997.3  In
the fiscal year up to September 1999, when Pastrana was already president, $287 million were given to
Colombia in military aid to improve tactics, mobility and firepower for greater effectiveness in drug eradication
and interdiction.
In July 2000—toward the end of Clinton’s tenure—the U.S. Congress approved $1.3 billion for Plan
Colombia.  During the first year (2000-1), $860.3 million were allocated; of these $642.3 million (74.66%)
were for the Armed Forces and the Police.  And on top of Plan Colombia, about $330 million went to on-
going U.S. assisted projects.
The bulk of the Plan’s military assistance ($416.9 million) was destined to build, train and equip three
antinarcotic Army battalions and to develop drug interdiction operations ($101.8 million).  The Police received
$115.6 million.  These antidrug operations were supported with the delivery of helicopters and air radar
systems.  The U.S. also built a technologically sophisticated intelligence system.  At the same time,
U.S.A.I.D. invested $42.5 million in legal crop substitution programs, $30 million to assist individuals
displaced by the violence, and $47 million in human rights and democracy programs.4  I should note in the
light of the post-September 11 “war on terrorism” reaction, that in approving Plan Colombia, the U.S.
Congress not only prohibited a combat role for our military and their assisting Colombian military operations
in the field; the United States was only to exclusively aid the war on drugs, it would have no involvement in
the counterinsurgency war.  The position is a bit bizarre in that the Marxist guerrillas are involved in the
narcotraffic!  But such sophistry is not absent from Washington:  during the Nicaraguan Contra war it was
stipulated that its purpose was not to change the Sandinista government, but rather only to interdict Nicaraguan
military supplies to El Salvador’s Marxist rebels.
Colombia’s neighbors manifested concern with Plan Colombia: the escalation of fighting could displace
Colombian guerrillas or refugees through porous jungle borders into their own territory; narco activities might
be displaced to them...  Thus the current Bush administration requested $882 million for an Andean Regional
Initiative, which complements Plan Colombia and included the other countries (except Venezuela).  In 1991,
the administration obtained $731 million, of which $399 million were destined to supplement Colombian
needs.
Currently the situation is fluid in light of the post-September 11 “global war on terror” and the breakdown
of the Colombian peace process.  The Bush administration has been making statements to the effect that the
United States should broaden its security role beyond counternarcotics assistance, to help Colombia take more
aggressive, proactive action against the insurgency.  The FARC, ELN and the AUC “paramilitaries” are on the
U.S. list of foreign terrorist organizations.  What is now called the Andean Counterdrug Initiative covers $379
million in assistance for Colombia in 2002.  And of the $537 million earmarked for Colombia in President
Bush’s budget request for 2003, $98 million would be used to train and equip a new brigade of Colombian
soldiers, to defend an Occidental Petroleum oil pipeline repeatedly blown up by the rebels.5  The U.S. press
has also reported that the Bush plan considers sharing with Colombia intelligence useful for reasons other than
counternarcotics missions, and to provide anti-kidnapping assistance.  Also the U.S. Government is requesting
the extradition of guerrillas involved in the drug traffic.
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Magnitude of the Problem
When in 1965 two prominent Colombian businessmen were kidnapped and killed, a state of consternation took
hold in my circle of Colombian social contacts.  Since then allegedly “more than half the world’s kidnappings
occur in Colombia.”6  I personally know (as a result of my University of Illinois activities) more than a dozen
persons killed, kidnapped or seriously injured, not to speak of those who have for security reasons become
exiles.  In the late 1980s, when I was doing research again in Colombia, there were about 10,000 permanently
armed and active insurgents, not counting narco gangs.  The current estimate is 30,000.7  A prominent
Colombian political analyst, with whom I collaborated for many years, tells me that he does not feel secure
enough to go to rural areas and even in Bogota avoids going out at nights.  Indeed, the old Colombia where we
had so much fun has disappeared.
I make these personal references to convey a sense of the very serious, giving way of governability and law
and order in the country because of the unreliability of statistics.  In effect, there are confusing significant
variations in the published estimates.  I will just present this brief picture.
Since the violence between the two traditional parties* was unleashed by the 1946 election and change in
the ruling party—a process that became known as la violencia—Colombia has never been pacified.  Of course,
there have been ups and downs.  For example, by the mid-1960s there was a lull:  the old interparty violence
had virtually disappeared and the banditry into which it had evolved appeared to be rapidly receding.8  Yet we
could not be entirely optimistic.  So-called “independent republics” of originally Liberal Party connected
Marxist guerrillas, which became the FARC, were already in control of a few relatively isolated rural pockets. 
More troublesome, in the radical spirit of the Cuban Revolution—although with its own distinction and the
participation of Father Camilo Torres, a precursor of Liberation Theology—in 1965 the ELN social
revolutionaries established themselves as armed rebels in the mountains.  In 1970 yet another important
revolutionary group was formed, the very audacious April 19 Movement (M-19).  And other relatively less
important insurgent groups were formed in the 1960s and ‘70s, years in which the symbolism of the Cuban
Revolution powerfully attracted sectors of South American opinion.
Moreover, in the eighties during Belisario Bentancur’s term (1982-86) a dual phenomenon took place: a
strengthening of revolutionary groups partly as a consequence of the resources provided to them by Betancur in
his failed peace negotiations; and the emergence of the narcotraffic as a potent, obvious factor of terrorism,
either as an independent force of mafiosi groups who violently fought the political order, or as an added
financial resource of the guerrillas.  Since then some changes have taken place (e.g., as mentioned the M-19
negotiated its transformation into a peaceful, electoral party; after the killing of Pablo Escobar, the narcoterrorist
leader, and the constitutional prohibition of narcos’ extraditions during César Gaviria’s term of 1990-94, narco
violence against political leaders and its indiscriminate urban terrorism subsided; and the FARC and the
paramilitaries became more prominent actors).  But the overall trend was of an increased deterioration of the
state’s strength and substantially increased violence.  The objective of Plan Colombia was precisely to redress
this trend.
Colombia’s war is complex because it consists of a multiple-band affair.  It is not that the state fights
narcos and guerrillas.  Narcos have fought guerrillas while some guerrillas are narcos themselves
(narcoguerrillas).  Chaos is heightened by the so-called paramilitaries.  It is known that the incapacity of the
army and police to maintain order tends to result in the formation of vigilante militias.  They can perform
“services” for the state’s forces.  Thus the latter’s inclination to have links with them.  Property owners can be
natural allies of anti-Communist vigilantes.  And a fact of life is that in Colombia narco money became huge
and generous: not only do paramilitaries welcome it, it can help repair a local church, build a football field for a
                                                
*Conservative and Liberal.
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town...  Drug linked individuals are local property owners with status in some communities.  Thus there has
not been a simple war against drugs in the country.  Furthermore, while the paramilitaries’ thrust is not to
exercise revolutionary violence against the state, to defeat the guerrillas they have engaged in coercion and mass
murder of perceived or real sympathizers of guerrillas, and in drug trafficking and kidnapping.  While the U.S.
State Department informs of continuing links between some members of the security forces and paramilitary
groups, the Colombian military hierarchy is reported to be aware that the just mentioned patterns are
counterproductive; reportedly military force has been used against paramilitaries.9  The above actors—plus
common criminality which for decades has been exceptionally, conspicuously high in Colombia—make the
country a human rights nightmare.
Indeed, at the initiation of Plan Colombia it was being estimated that over 3,500 were killed by the
political violence every year.10  And in 2000, 3,706 were reported to the government as kidnapped, typically a
misreported figure; the National Police guessed that $250 million had been paid in ransom.  On the other hand,
the government’s planning office (DNP) estimated that in 2000 the subversives received $1.111 billion for
drugs, $570 million for extortion, and $320 million for kidnapping.  The common people were experiencing
high costs:  for instance, in 1999 some 300,000 had been driven by the violence from their rural homes and
displaced to other communities.  Colombia also suffered by the exodus of its human and financial capital: in
the last three years about 1.8 million emigrated abroad and $4.5 billion were transferred by Colombians to
foreign countries.  “Colombia is being left alone and poor,” a local newspaper stated.11
In short, in spite of the absence of support for a revolution by the general public—consistently shown by
public opinion surveys—and the desires of the population for peace, minorities of violentos had gained a
military power that far outweighs their political support through their accumulation of resources and inadequate
public policies.  One thing is clear:  the violentos had been able to place sympathizers in some strategic
positions of the power structure, but this did not mean any substantial public support for a Marxist revolution,
especially after the dramatic collapses experienced by European Communism and the end of the Cold War.
But the task of bringing a semblance of law and order to Colombia was awesome, hence Plan Colombia. 
As noted, the complex, vicious, many-sided violence had grown vis-à-vis a state without any coherent strategy
to meet the challenge and an unprepared armed force.  Obviously as the presence of violento groups increases
throughout a territory the magnitude of the problem is compounded.12  Public policy was characterized by
zigzags.  For example, four candidates for the 1990 presidential election were killed.  When in 1989 the Liberal
Party leader was murdered allegedly by narcos, the government abruptly reacted by occupying vast properties
and reintroducing their extradition to the United States.  It is revealing that at that time the armed force was so
ill-equipped that my regular diplomatic contact informed me that the government had confiscated from the
targeted narcos more helicopters than those in service for the Colombian armed forces!  Yet subsequently no
sustained effort was carried out by the following administrations to provide the resources to the Armed Forces
to turn “the war” in their favor.  They remained underfinanced and undermanned.  The state’s strategy cannot
exclusively be repressive but it has required a politically backed, more substantial military component.
Since Plan Colombia, the military situation is reported to have improved: a stronger army, with newly
formed professional units of better trained and equipped salaried soldiers, with a modern helicopter fleet, better
intelligence, coordination and mobility, capable of inflicting severe losses to guerrillas engaged in open battle. 
It was predicted at the recent end of the Peace Process that the guerrillas could not initiate battles lasting days,
as opposed to more classical operations of small-scale attacks against isolated units, ambushes and terrorist
actions and sabotage.13
At the same time, however, it was considered that the security forces were still underequipped and
undermanned, especially to control small-scale actions: terrorism can be done only by a few, for instance, it
takes two or three to blow up an energy tower...14  Colombia’s terrain is very difficult, with multiple mountain
ranges and vast jungles.  And the army was still considered insufficiently proactive, about half of its personnel
being used to protect fixed places.
I should note that despite the links with the paramilitaries imputed to the army, in public opinion surveys
the armed forces have been holding a good institutional image being ranked high.  Pro-military sources claim
that leftist NGOs have engaged in disinformation campaigns to tarnish the army’s image, “judicial wars”
against military commanders to purge the armed forces of competent leadership and reduce their resources.15
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The case in point, the theory that poverty and social injustice have resulted in Colombia’s most atypical
decades of violencia finds little logical support in the Latin American context of very different historical
experiences with political violence and banditry.
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PART THREE
On the Sociology of the Problem
How did Colombia get to the point that it turned to proposing Plan Colombia, in spite of years with a
moderate nationalism that sought a low-key U.S. presence in the country and did not favor U.S. military
assistance?16  The problem of violence with its domestic and foreign pressures had reached the point where it
overwhelmed the nation.  The best method for understanding the phenomenon is through a historical-
sociological approach.
In the mid-1940s Colombia found itself toward the bottom of Latin America’s group of most developed
nations socioeconomically.  Politically, however, it was characterized by a tradition of civilian rule through a
resilient two-party, multi-social class system.  The two parties found roots from the upper class to the
peasantry.  Unfortunately, this condition—theoretically favorable for political democracy—had only been
related to an absence of military coups d’état and rule, for in fact the prevalent form of government had been
only “protodemocratic” by party civilian oligarchies.17  That is, while governments were periodically changed
per constitutionally prescribed “elections,” these were not considered genuine or fair by substantial oppositions.
 The usual type of rule consisted of the “hegemony” of one of the parties: the notion that normally the party in
power, although changing its leaders, would not recognize electoral defeat.*  The democratic creed had not
sufficiently flourished among either the elites or the masses.  The adaptation to these conditions had been long
periods in which the opposition acquiesced to subordinate roles, not contesting displacement from power of the
hegemonic party.  Indeed, interparty nationwide competition to change the ruling party was associated with
escalated violence.  But for historical reasons, from 1946 until 1949 such sustained, full-blown interparty
competition took place.  The result: the breakdown of the traditional system in the face of escalated political
violence, and the brief dictatorship (not the protodemocratic hegemony) of one of the two parties.  About a
decade later—in the late 1950s—the civilian elites of the two parties agreed on an interparty consociational or
coalition regime as a way to restore their political control (although a shared one) hopefully in a pacified
country.18   A military regime had briefly replaced them (1953 to 1957).
Peculiar to the period of escalated political violence from 1946 on was the latter’s relative autonomy from
the highest party elites, an “undeclared civil war” as Colombians said.  For in contrast to the previous pattern
of “declared wars,” in which party national leaders became generals in the civil wars, now this was not the case:
the civilian leaders did not take up arms and fight, although their “salon” politics were in serious crisis.  In
short, for more than a decade Colombia’s top ruling political class had coexisted with a violent populace in
large regions of the country.  However, after the initiation in 1958 of the power-sharing constitutional
arrangement dividing the control of the state between the two parties,** the rationales for the extreme
partisanship—the traditional sectarismo—of the two parties lost basis, with the traditional violencia
progressively disappearing and its remainders turning into banditry.  As mentioned earlier, by the term of the
second president of the coalition regime, Guillermo León Valencia (1962-66), it was generally considered that
the problem of violence had improved.***
Colombia’s political establishment had shown a detached, relative tolerance not only for political violence
but for other illegalities as well.  In the mid-1960s, although I was coming to Colombia from the crime-ridden
area surrounding the University of Chicago, I was astounded with the levels of common criminality that I
found.  Furthermore, in large sections of the principal cities markets openly specializing in contraband products
                                                
*Until recently, the best known variant of this kind of regime was the Mexican Partido Revolucionario
Institucional (PRI, or Institutional Revolutionary Party).
**Technically, the new regime—the National Front—was a consociational democracy.
***Incidentally, some gruesome patterns of violence reported recently were notorious during the early years.
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operated in front of everybody.  Violent mafias already controlled the mining and commercialization of
emeralds, a precedent of the future narcos...
At about the same time in the early 1960s, in the political realm a U.S. Alliance for Progress-John
Kennedy inspired counterinsurgency strategy was adopted by the Colombian army, which during the Valencia
administration focused against the Marxist “independent republics” introduced earlier in this paper.  Those were
the years of the Operación Marquetalia, the Plan Lazo...  Actually, these military operations did not succeed. 
Tiro Fijo, today’s FARC leader, survived, as well as what are considered to be his oldest guerrillas of the
Americas.  Quite simply, while for years the Colombian army published its “successes” in producing many
casualties to the revolutionaries, and blamed the continuing violence on the periodic amnesties given by the
civilian governments to captured insurgents, forty years ago already the Colombian security forces lacked the
resources to pacify the country!19  And to repeat, starting with the Valencia administration, under the influence
of the Cuban Revolution the problem of violence was compounded by the successive formation of new guerrilla
groups: the ELN, the M-19, etc.  True, the extant post-1958 coalition regime was an experiment in imperfect
democracy (deemed necessary as a temporary transition to overcome the historical protodemocracies).  But
rather than seek to perfect democracy, the revolutionaries were new expressions of Colombia’s incapacity to
institutionalize a democracy.  Indeed, while the establishment progressively democratized the regime, to this
day the undemocratic character and criminality predominant among the violent revolutionaries is obvious.
Of course, the civilian governments (of virtually uninterrupted interparty coalitions) that started forty-four
years ago must be considered responsible for the lack of a sustained, coherent strategy to effectively deal with
the violence.  But the context in which they operated consisted of a public opinion generally, even very
substantially opposed to war.  This contributed both to the unviability of a successful revolution, to relatively
weak revolutionary momenta, and to the recurrent initiatives by governments to negotiate with the radicalized
armed minorities.20  Secondly, the public opposition to violence usually coexisted with high levels of
alienation from the political regime.  Majorities were normally unhappy with their form of government
(although this did not translate into concrete support for a military dictatorship).  This contributed to
governmental timidity.  After all, the military modernization to pacify the country was a very costly
proposition—the elites themselves resisted increases in taxation—and to successfully complete an
administration’s four year term it was best not to rock the boat.  And then Colombia’s governments eventually
were faced with the “bad luck” of the dramatic development of the powerful narco phenomenom, which was
largely blamed by Colombians on the foreigners who were the drug consumers.
The nature of civilian-military relations also conspired against developing a better prepared armed force. 
Colombia’s military had a tradition with an explicit professional doctrine of bureaucratic subordination to
presidential authority (determined by others).  Normally the party system reinforced this tradition, by
systematically changing its leaders and not forming political coalitions with army factions to determine the
executive.  Moreover, in the past decades retired military officers critical of the establishment’s policies did not
find significant political party support for their aspirations to form an elected government,21 limiting their
political scope.  This is not to say that relations between the civilian governments and the army in the difficult
task of fighting subversion were always smooth.  There is credible evidence that there were instances in which
top commanders were available to move to replace the government.  Yet, since 1957 such an event did not take
place.  Thus, the military policies of the political class—deficient as they might have been perceived by
officers—prevailed.  And such tensions that publicly produced military retirements reminded politicians of the
dangers of relying too much on an armed force strategy in their governance.  My own impression from
interviewing Colombian officers was that the armed forces constituted Weberian formal legal bureaucracies that
were allowed autonomy by the governments in their routinized operations (except in some limited areas, such
as in top personnel/promotions decisions); officers with comfortable bureaucratic careers assured by their loyalty
to governments headed every four years by a new leader; and officers not too anxious about technical military
needs while enjoying the conviviality of their military clubs and expecting satisfactory retirement payoffs.
Colombia had gone through many years of unawareness of a vital aspect of its social reality, without any
real public debate of its own security issues.22  As we have seen this not only resulted from the influence of
violentos over the ruling political class nor because the latter was corrupted by them.
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PART FOUR
Security Implications
Colombia is a large country (1.14 million square kilometers, 40.8 million people), rich in natural resources
(including petroleum), and not that far from the United States (it is closer to fly from Miami to Bogota than
from New York to London).  Colombia finds itself between Venezuela and Panama, and also has borders with
Brazil, Ecuador and Peru.  A convulsed, violent Colombia—because its state cannot either control
revolutionaries financed through crime (drugs, kidnappings, etc.) nor exercise reasonable control over wealthy,
organized mafiosi criminals—poses serious threats to its own security.  In the last few weeks the press has
reported grisly, antidemocratic acts attributed to both challenges (e.g., the kidnapping and indefinite retention
of a presidential candidate and of a senator, among others, part of the campaign to sabotage the coming
elections; the murder of the archbishop of the country’s third largest city, an outspoken opponent of the mass
kidnapping of churchgoers by insurgents and of the financial control of candidates by drug lords).  Colombia
should not have a state dominated by such bestial revolutionaries nor a narco-state.  This is especially the case
when such power does not result from the democratic support of its own people.
Plan Colombia was an emergency assistance, a classic example of (a primarily) U.S. foreign intervention in
support of a regime in crisis, to stabilize it and thus retain an international environment friendly to the United
States.  The context of assisting Colombia’s amicable government was the pre-September 11 priority for
international cooperation to control drug trafficking.
It is in the interest of the United States not to have hostile nations in this hemisphere.  Clearly, if
Colombia were controlled by the aforementioned groups the governments formed would be unfriendly to the
U.S., if for no other reason that they were and are committed to have unlawful economic relations with the
United States: narcotics exports.  Even if the U.S. Government adopted narco policies of legalization/total
laissez-faire, it is very doubtful that the above groups could generate governments in Colombia with a
semblance of stability.  The groups lack the political frame of mind, organization and support to do so. 
Continuing convulsiveness in Colombia works against mutual economic gains for Colombia and the U.S., and
as we saw it poses a serious challenge to American immigration policy.  A Colombia in chaos poses
comparable problems to its immediate neighbors and the potential to spread violence to them through porous
borders.23  It undermines the regional system of security of the Organization of American States (OAS)
supportive of democratic legality.
If it is better in the still unstable Latin American political/economic environment to have friendly
governments in place, Plan Colombia must be assessed on its own nature.  As in the successful U.S. Central
American policies of the 1980s and ‘90s the Plan envisions a limited U.S. military commitment.  But for
Colombia the U.S. Congress limited the assistance only to fight the drug traffic, not terrorism.  Further, as
earlier in Central America, the assistance to the government is conditioned to its human rights performance, and
the number of American military personnel involved in the assistance is limited and cannot participate in
combat situations in the field.  Given the total resources available, clearly the United States is involved in
supporting a limited war to bolster Colombia’s security forces, and replace a mood of defeatism by one of
greater hope that the anarchy can be progressively reduced.  My reading of Colombian materials suggests that
the prevalent scenario is locally limited to meet the internal violent aggression with increased strength, so
that—as in Central America—conditions materialize conducive to negotiate peace agreements in the future.
As reported earlier, the Bush administration has been seeking to expand the U.S. role in the Colombian
fight.  I find disquieting the messianic, Manichean, bellicose tone of some of its representatives, as well as the
tendency to oversimplify and oscillate between isolationism and unilateralism.  U.S. assistance cannot replace
the role of the political will of Colombia’s elected governments.  As earlier in Central America, it is wise not
to commit American personnel to the fighting and to maintain human rights conditions for the U.S. assistance.
However, the current limitation of aiding only the war against drugs is unrealistic in the face of the
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narcoguerrilla phenomenon.  Furthermore, it projects the image of a narrow-minded, selfish United States: “we
only support what is of our interest and don’t care about anything else.”
There is the bigger question of the U.S. war against drugs.  For the 2003 budget, the Bush administration
has maintained its emphasis on controlling their supply as opposed to consumption, even though reference is
made to the goal of cutting drug abuse by 25 percent in five years.24  But so far the positive overall effects in
reducing the supply of cocaine cannot be seen.  This is the case reported for Colombia.25  In Bolivia, where the
illegal cultivation of coca has been reduced, this has taken place at some political costs.  In the last year, coca
growers have periodically created major protest disturbances with some casualties.  These problems have
involved the highest government officials, as well as mediation efforts of the Roman Catholic hierarchy, and
friction with the American Embassy.  In fact, the U.S. drug policy was accompanied by a high-profile
meddling in public policy on the part of the latter.26  In sum, judging from the past we should not be overly
optimistic about the war against drugs, a reason for the resilience of the advocacy of treatment and legalization.
This is another matter, however.
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